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Abstract
The paper discusses the state of Czech democracy and current research agendas on democracy in 
the Czech Republic, focusing in particular on the role of political parties. It considers Czech democracy 
both in relation to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in the light of the evolving relationship 
between CEE and Western Europe. It suggests that current CEE states such as the Czech Republic 
gradually approximating to models of West European-style party politics may need rethinking. It then 
examines democracy in the Czech Republic in relation to debates on democratic “backsliding”, arguing 
that in the Czech cases the principal “backsliding” risks lie less in the rise of authoritarian populists 
than a potential crisis of democratic representation driven by perceptions of corruption. The paper 
concludes with some suggestions about future avenues for research on Czech and CEE democracy.
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“So two cheers for Democracy: one because it admits variety and two because it 
admits criticism. Two cheers are quite enough: there is no occasion to give three.” 
E.M. Forster, “What I Believe”
1. Introduction
Some years ago I attended a conference on democracy in Europe and ended up talking to 
a very prominent specialist on Russian politics. We had an interesting conversation, but at 
one point in the evening he turned to me and asked in a slightly worried tone if I realized 
that the Czech Republic didn’t really matter very much. I appreciated the advice – and I un-
derstood it: small, slightly peripheral countries are often considered marginal in comparative 
politics. They lack inherent geo-political importance and, as Barrington Moore (1966: xxiii) 
argued, their politics tend to be driven by – or copied from – stronger powers beyond their 
own borders.
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But the politics of the Czech Republic and Czech democracy do matter. They matter, of 
course, to citizens and residents of the Czech Republic, whose lives and life chances are di-
rectly affected by how the country is governed. However, Barrington Moore notwithstanding, 
they also matter in other ways, comparatively and theoretically. In this presentation I discuss 
the state of Czech democracy in relation both to the CEE region and the wider relationship 
between CEE and Western Europe, focusing in particular on the role of political parties which 
are central to the process of democratic representation. I will suggest that the model of CEE 
state “transiting” towards an approximate, if imperfect, model of West European-style party 
politics may need rethinking but that the dangers of democratic “backsliding” in CEE are 
real, if potentially overstated. For the Czech Republic this is so less in the rise of authoritarian 
populists than a potential crisis of democratic representation driven by rising perceptions of 
corruption and the breakdown of the model of “standard” party and party competition estab-
lished in 1990s. I conclude with some suggestions about directions that future research on 
Czech democracy might take.
2. Who Is Catching Up with Whom?
The current malaise or, if we want to use the word, crisis of Czech democracy is part of a big-
ger picture, both within Central and Eastern Europe and in Europe more widely. Democracies 
in the reunited Europe, including that of the Czech Republic, are converging but not in ways 
we might once have imaged. Western European party politics has been presented, implicitly or 
explicitly, as a model for emulation by the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE). A great deal of political science writing about the Czech Republic and the CEE region 
has been preoccupied with the question of whether – and to what extent – these newer democ-
racies fit models formulated on the basis of the Western European historical experience. There 
is thus a rich comparative literature asking if CEE institutions as diverse as welfare regimes 
(Aidukaite 2009), varieties of capitalism (Holscher et al. 2006; Adam et al. 2009) and political 
parties fit models defined by older, more established democracies (Roberts 2006; Fortin 2008; 
Hloušek and Kopeček 2010). 
Similar assumptions permeate wider discussions about democracy and democratic rep-
resentation in CEE itself. It is still – to me strikingly – not uncommon for Czech politicians 
and commentators, for example, to refer the “standard” party (standardní strana). This term, 
coined in the 1990s, which is almost impossible meaningfully to translate into English seems 
to refer to the ideal of a programmatic party with a national membership structure whose ideo-
logy and identity match one or other of the big party families of Western Europe.
But this was always a hard model (or set of models) for CEE to follow. Western Europe’s 
social  and  political  institutions  were  shaped  by  distinct  historical  legacies  of  state-  and 
civil society (re-)building, modernization, democratization and booming post-war welfare 
capitalism, which CEE states did not share. It was also a model which, at least as far as 
political parties and party-based democracy are concerned, has been gradually unwinding 
and eroding. As Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2012) have noted, the continuing ability 
of Western  Europe’s  established  parties  to  hold  together  diverse  and  fluid  electorates  is 
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loyal voters and in the remnants of grassroots mass organization and bases in organized 
civil society.
If, as parties’ slow retreat from civil society to the state suggests, traditional party politics 
in its Western European heartland is in inexorable decline, there are, as Peter Mair (2013) 
pointed out, sharp questions to be asked about the future shape of representative democracy in 
Western Europe. The logic – starkly outlined by Colin Crouch (2005) – is for the emergence 
of fragmented “post-democratic” societies of apathetic but angry political consumers and in-
distinguishable elite-based parties dependent on big money and big media. 
Paradoxically, in many ways this may mean Western Europe may slowly come to resemble 
the post-communist East. If, to borrow the conceit of Adam Przeworski (1991: 191), we forget 
history and geographical location for a moment and put Ireland in the place of Slovakia or 
Italy in the place of Bulgaria, we see: political parties that are ineffectual at representing and 
mobilizing a resentful anti-political public; economies in need of reform; welfare services 
struggling to cope with ageing populations; billionaire populists and oligarchs muscling their 
way into politics; and politicians struggling to fix a European project whose long-term conse-
quences were not fully understand.
It may be that Western Europe is moving towards a Central and Eastern model rather than 
vice versa. In years to come the “standard party” for all European democracies may look more 
like ANO or Věci veřejné than German Christian Democracy or the British Labour Party. In-
deed a party such as ANO and a politician such as Andrej Babiš already seem to approximate 
the classic Downsian model of democracy based on the free competition of ideologically 
pragmatic parties which “might formulate policies in order to win elections rather than win 
elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs 1957: 28).
So  democracy  in  the  Czech  Republic  and  other  Central  European  states  matters  be-
cause – despite differences of context – in important ways it does not fundamentally differ 
from democracy elsewhere and may, moreover, offer Western Europeans a glimpse of own 
their future.
3. Backsliding in CEE?
Questions of Czech democracy are also part of a wider debate about the fate of democracy 
in Central and Eastern Europe. There were fears after 1989 that Central and Eastern Europe 
would quickly lapse into Latin-American style instability and authoritarianism (Greskovits 
1998). Adam Przeworski (1991: 191) famously wrote that the “East has become the South” 
while Vladimir Tismaneanu (1996) believed the region was “waiting for Peron”.
However, contrary to initial expectations Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) emerged glo-
bally as one of the most successful democratizing regions. Many states in the region, including 
the Czech Republic, appeared to achieve rapid domestically-driven consolidation within a few 
years of the fall of communism. Others did so more slowly and painfully but – seemingly un-
der the influence of prospective European Union membership – made steady progress (Linz 
and Stepan 1996; Vachudová 2005; Møller 2009).
However, following the 2004–2007 enlargement of the European Union – and particularly 
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observers have increasingly started to speak in terms of democratic backsliding or “demo-
cratic rollback” in CEE (Rupnik 2007; Merkel 2010; Mungiu-Pippidi 2007; Plattner and Dia-
mond 2007; Ágh 2010): a reversal of earlier democratic gains and the emergence of problems 
which severely interfere with democratic processes in ways going beyond earlier concerns 
about lows levels of civic disengagement or anaemic civil societies (Rupnik and Zielonka 
2013; Mueller 2014). The symptoms of apparent backsliding have varied from country to 
country – and from commentator to commentator. However, commonly mentioned indicators 
include: 
  • Sharp electoral swings empowering some governing parties with absolute parliamentary 
majorities despite the relatively power-dispersing nature of CEE democratic institutions 
(Hungary, Slovakia, Romania);
  • The willingness of incumbent elites to pursue illiberal projects of constitutional change 
(conservative-nationalist parties in Hungary, Poland) or to flout constitutional norms to 
entrench their own power (Romania, Czech Republic); 
  • The worsening of (perceived) problems of corruption and state capture to the point that 
levels of distrust lead to a breakdown in public faith in the very notion of democratic re-
presentation (Bulgaria) (Ganev 2014);
  • The collapse of established mainstream parties and electoral breakthrough of short-lived 
populist outsider parties leading to cycles of weak and ineffective government (Pop-Ele-
ches 2010; Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2014; Hanley and Sikk forthcoming).
4. What Ails Czech Democracy? 
How does the Czech Republic measure up in these terms? Czech democracy has not so far suf-
fered from dangerous concentrations of power and does not have strong players with illiberal 
political visions. There is no Czech Viktor Orbán or Victor Ponta. At the national level there is 
no party as politically dominant as Smer currently is in Slovakia or Fidesz in Hungary – and, 
tellingly, there never has been. Indeed, Czech political scientists have been more concerned 
about the failure of the country’s electoral politics and electoral system to generate clear and 
sustainable parliamentary majorities (Havlík and Kopeček 2008; Balík 2013) than the risks 
of power concentration.
As in much of Europe, there are of course wells of illiberal sentiments and racism in Czech 
public opinion and there is certainly electoral potential for radical right populism, although 
on a comparatively limited scale: research by the Czech Ministry of the Interior and Hunga-
ry’s Political Capital think-tank (Ministerstvo vnitra ČR 2010; Political Capital 2014), using 
somewhat different measures and methodologies, both concluded that the potential for such 
a party was around 8 per cent. Czech far right parties, however, continue to be singularly po-
litically unsuccessful and electorally marginal (Mareš 2011). 
The Czech Republic does, however, have CEE’s most electorally successful radical left 
party: the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). The KSČM can be (and has 
been) interpreted as an extremist or anti-system radical party, although this view is disputed. 
However, even if we accept this characterization, the Czech Communists are extremists of 
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pressures for some years to come (Linek 2008) – and despite a modest increase in support in 
the 2013 parliamentary elections – KSČM has limited potential for electoral growth. Even if 
a favourable constellation emerged, the Czech Communists seem unlikely to ever act as more 
than a junior coalition partner at the national level, as they currently are in many regional 
governments.
As developments in recent years in Hungary and Romania underline, it is erstwhile main-
stream politicians in government “breaking bad” rather than the rise of radical outsider parties 
that poses the more serious threat to democracy in CEE. Some commentators have cast Miloš 
Zeman, the Czech Republic’s first directly elected president, as “one of a new breed of demo-
cratically elected populist strongmen (…) deploying the power of the state and a battery of 
instruments of intimidation to crush dissent, demonize opposition, tame the media and tailor 
the system to their ends” (Traynor 2013). Domestic critics accused Zeman of initiating the 
“Putinization” of politics (Müller 2013) already detected elsewhere in CEE (Economist 2010; 
New York Times 2010).
However, if Zeman’s appointment over the heads of the country’s political parties of the 
(supposedly) technocratic caretaker government of Jiří Rusnok in July 2013 was an attempt 
to bend the Czech constitution into a semi-presidential system, it was a notably unsuccessful 
one. In the end, the experiment in “Zemanocracy” as Lidové noviny (26 July 2013) acerbically 
termed it, once again underlined the weakness of the Czech presidency, even a directly elected 
Czech presidency, as a vehicle for consolidating political power. If this was “Putinization” it 
was Putinization-lite. 
Both the Czech Republic’s formal institutions – a parliamentary system; a proportional 
electoral system; a bi-cameral legislature – and its de facto configuration of social and politi-
cal actors are relatively dispersed and power-dispersing. Indeed, even the country’s clientelis-
tic networks that structure informal politics seem decentralized compared to other CEE states 
(Klíma 2013). The relatively dispersed spread of power and relative robustness of formal 
institutions, especially political parties, thus thwarted whatever ambition Zeman may have 
harboured to become a “Czech Putin” (as well as his more modest – and more democratic – 
ambitions to unite the Czech left under his personal leadership – Koutník 2012). 
5. Corruption, Anti-Politics and Party Government
But Czech democracy appears more troubled in terms of its ability to provide representation, 
good governance and high quality public goods. Its most deeply rooted problems centre on 
corruption and more underlying sentiments of injustice viewing political elites as self-serving, 
untrustworthy and unrepresentative (Smith 2008). According to Gallup polling in 2013, 94 % 
of Czechs perceived corruption as widespread – higher than in Ghana or South Africa – while 
71 % of companies considered corruption to be the main hurdle to doing business in the Czech 
Republic (Gallup 2013). The country performs less poorly on other indices such Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) or the World Bank Control of Corruption 
Index (CCI), but is still generally mid-low-ranking among CEE EU members.1 As Innes 
(2013) notes, such underperformance sits uneasily with the Czech Republic’s high levels of 
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As elsewhere in Europe, public perceptions of corruption may outstrip measurable reali-
ties. According to Eurobarometer polling, while 95 % of Czech respondents view corruption 
as widespread, only 28 % claim to be affected by it in daily life (European Commission 2014). 
However, what matters politically is the social fact of corruption – what people understand 
to be true regarding the institutions and elites – rather than the difficult-to-grasp and complex 
reality. Moreover, in some respects the Czech public’s sweeping negative judgement seems 
well grounded. In the field of public procurement – where business and politics intersect most 
directly and where huge resources are available for capture – levels of corruption in the Czech 
Republic appear alarmingly high. In 2012–2013 the World Competitiveness Index measure 
for the corrupt diversion of public funds ranked the Czech Republic 117th of 148 states – be-
low Albania, Romania and Russia – marking a drastic deterioration since 2006–2007 (Schwab 
2013: 412).2
High and growing levels of public distrust in the effectiveness and honesty of the political 
system have had a corrosive effect on established representative institutions and, in particular, 
on the party system. This is unsurprising. Parties are pivotal institutions for interest aggrega-
tion, representation, state-society linkage and accountability in most democracies. This is par-
ticularly the case in the Czech Republic, which has (re-)built its post-1989 democracy around 
the notion of “standard” party politics. The Czech Constitution even goes so far as to state that 
political parties are the basis of democratic competition and the Czech Constitutional Court 
has elaborated in some detail the (intended) role of parties as a channel for representation and 
participation (Ústavní soud 2011).
Indeed the role and status of political parties is central not just legally and constitutionally 
but has always been at the heart of wider Czech debates about democracy: revealingly all first 
four democratically elected presidents of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic – Masaryk 
Beneš, Havel and Klaus – made well developed contributions to debates about the role of par-
ties. In both elite discourse and at the mass level (see Linek 2004), frustrations with the work-
ings of democracy therefore quickly tend to translate into debates about the (mal)functioning 
of parties and the party system.
6. An Unravelling Party System
Until quite recently the Czech Republic was one of a number of CEE democracies which 
appeared to have succeeded in building working approximations of Western European-style 
party systems: a stable set of core parties with recognisable and consistent ideologies (con-
servatives, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Communists) which, to varying degrees, 
had laid down organizational roots in society (Deegan-Krause 2006; Deegan-Krause and 
Haughton 2010; Linek and Lyons 2013). It was even possible to speak of some degree of 
institutionalization (Casal Bertoa 2011) and (certainly in the Czech context) a fully formed 
cleavage which “closed” the party system making it a structured, stable and predictable envi-
ronment (Deegan-Krause 2006) allowing voters to make clear choices and to hold incumbent 
parties accountable from election to election. 
There had been criticisms since at least mid-1990s of the hollow, formal character of Czech 
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cal parties and cultivated weakness of its civil society (see, for example, Pehe 2002). These 
intensified from the time of collapse of the first Klaus government in December 1997 and the 
subsequent signing of the 1998 “Opposition Agreement” between the two main parties to al-
low a minority centre-left administration to assume office. Indeed, the Opposition Agreement 
is seen by some writers (Tabery 2008; Klíma 2001), as a decisive turning point in the history 
of Czech post-communist democracy, setting the country on a path towards increasingly cor-
rupt and collusive forms of governance.3
However, events of the last five years have not only underlined the “fragile stability” 
(Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2014) of the Czech party system, but led to more far-reaching 
claims that a qualitative transformation in the character of Czech party democracy has taken 
place. Parties, it was argued, were no longer to be regarded as programmatic actors or vehicles 
for political participation but as brokers of clientelistic exchanges between elites. Grassroots 
membership was largely a façade sustained by non-existent “dead souls” or paid foot soldiers, 
while ideological differences were feigned or secondary. Innes (2013), for example, regards 
the Czech party system as a prime example of a “brokerage party system” where “new pub-
lic policies are largely the by-products of identified opportunities for rent-seeking by allied 
party and business elites” and in which “brokerage parties (…) instrumentalize the effec-
tive mainstream space of ideological competition to primarily private ends” (2013: 13, 15; 
my emphasis). Similarly, Klíma argues (2013: 215) that the post-communist political and 
social environment has gradually engendered the “emergence of a qualitatively different type 
of party” which he terms the “clientelistic party”.4 Both major post-1989 Czech parties (ODS 
and ČSSD), he suggests, degenerated into formations of this kind such that the “the dominant 
cleavage that polarized Czech politics in the May 2010 election was the split between civil 
society and the official political leadership, represented by clientelistically adapted parties” 
(2013: 223; my emphasis). 
Such a drastically changed and corrupted party system is, however, seen as having a self-
destructive quality: the rise of corruption as a salient issue leads established parties to haemor-
rhage voters and members, opening up space for ill-defined, new anti-establishment parties 
with vague platforms of anti-corruption and reform (Věci veřejné in 2010, ANO in 2013) 
(Hanley and Sikk forthcoming; Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2014). There are obvious con-
sequences for democracy and democratic quality in such a pattern. Repeated breakthroughs by 
(usually short-lived) anti-establishment parties not only weaken their establishment competi-
tors, but leave coalition governments weaker and less effective, stoking up public discontent, 
preparing the next wave of anti-establishment protest voting. When, as in the Czech case, new 
parties are backed by business interests seeking to capture or co-opt the anti-corruption and 
reform agenda – whose credibility as outsiders is short-lived – this cycle may be still sharper. 
Such an accelerating spiral of protest, instability and weak governance inevitably makes 
democratic choices less clear or reduces them to a simplified (and sometime bogus) distinc-
tion between old and new parties, or establishment and outsiders. The instability of loosely 
defined, anti-establishment “project parties” also makes them hard to hold to account if, as is 
often the case, when they do enter government they simply may not last from one election to 
the next (Hanley and Sikk forthcoming). 
In short, it appears that the Czech Republic’s 20 year-long experiment in Western European 
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socioeconomic frustration and anti-political protest voting. The model we have to fear for the 
Czech Republic is thus not a Hungarian-style concentration of power in the hands of a dom-
inant ruling party or charismatic populist leader, but a Bulgaria-style breakdown of trust and 
a rejection of any and all parties. If Bulgaria is a harbinger, then cycles of protest voting may, 
in the end, give way to waves of anti-political civic mobilization disconnected from electoral 
institutions and processes (Ganev 2014). Indeed, the Czech Republic has already experienced 
short-lived episodes of similar protest: the “Thank You, Now Go” movement of 1999, the 
“Television Crisis” protests of 2000–2001 (Dvořáková 2003; Stroehlein 2001) and more re-
cently – and on a smaller scale – the unexpected grassroots resonance in 2012 of the Holešov 
Appeal (Holešovská výzva) launched by an alliance of fringe groupings (Cunningham 2012).
7. Two Cheers for Czech Democracy
The titles of papers at this symposium, many of which include terms such as “crisis”, “failure” 
and “threat” reflect a concern with what has gone wrong with Czech democracy and, in doing 
so, tie in with wider debates about backsliding and democratic malaise in Central and Eastern 
Europe and across Europe generally. It makes obvious sense to ask what has gone wrong and 
needs fixing, rather than to ask what has gone right. But I would add a small word of cau-
tion. As Stephen Runciman (2014) points out in his recently published book The Confidence 
Trap, debates on democracy historically have veered between exaggerated pessimism about 
irreversible looming decline and exaggerated optimism that democracy is consolidated and 
triumphant. Debates on the modernization of democracy, he also notes, are almost always 
framed in terms of “crisis”. 
Having understood that Czech and Central European democracy is more troubled, more 
corrupt and more prone to elite misbehaviour than we might once have hoped, it would be very 
easy to fall into a darkly populist view of democracy in the region; to take the view that formal 
institutional structures don’t matter; that ideological and programmatic differences no longer 
exist; that corrupt elites and interest groups manipulate the democratic process to such an 
extent that competitive institutions are a mere façade; and that political and economic power 
are totally fused and lie exclusively in the hands of shadowy economic elites. 
Some well-informed journalistic commentators on Czech business and politics sometimes 
come close to this. Erik Best (2012) writes of the “Five Families” – political/business groups 
whom he sees as the main holders of power in the Czech Republic. Others write in a similar 
way of an informal power “cartel” (de Candole 2012). This is excellent and provocative jour-
nalism but it is striking that the underlying argument of these commentaries – that a corrupt 
economic and political elite is conspiring against society behind a facade of democratic com-
petition – are archetypically populist. Although the language is less florid, the basic argumen-
tation strongly reminds me of articles I once read in the extreme right-wing weekly Republika 
in the 1990s when studying Miroslav Sládek and his Republican Party (see Hanley 2012). 
This does not necessarily make such analysis wrong. Sládek and his fellow Republicans 
may have been better – or more prophetic – political analysts than I thought at the time. But 
it may be leaving out and overlooking the functional and “normal” parts of Czech democ-
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fragmented and dispersed; institutions are sometimes resistant to politicians; that judges and 
prosecutors act autonomously; society can mobilise against political elites; that voters are 
tempted by anti-politics but not by ideological radicalism; that the electorate is rational and 
seeks democratic reform (see Roberts 2014). The key to understanding a democracy such 
as that of the Czech Republic is thus perhaps to understand how different and contradictory 
logics of representation coincide and co-exist.5 Indeed, as Morgan (2012) notes in her work 
on Latin America, such complexity is common in many democratic polities where politicians 
and parties conventionally rely on a hybrid “linkage portfolio” combining programmatic, 
corporate (interest-based) and programmatic components, shifting between them over time 
as circumstances dictate.
The English novelist E. M. Forster, in an essay written in 1938, argued that even in times 
of crisis and uncertainty we should give two (but not three) cheers for democracy. Democratic 
politics he thought might be corrupt and corrupting – at least for politicians – but it kept its 
worst excesses in check through criticism and competition and allowed the freedom and di-
versity needed for a civilized society to develop of its own accord (Forster 1976: 83–90). On 
this these grounds Czech democracy certainly still deserves two cheers. Czech politics is still 
a story of democracy, even it is not quite the democratic success story once imagined or is not 
successful in quite the ways once assumed. 
8. How the Czech Republic Really Works
How then should we approach the study of democracy in the Czech Republic and Central 
Europe more generally in such changed times? It is clearly not enough to say that the glass of 
water could be seen as half full, as well as half empty. For me there are perhaps two directions 
political scientists interested in the functioning of political parties and representative institu-
tions in CEE should take, both of which imply developing a stronger sociological sensibility 
and moving towards what Kubik (2013) terms “contextual holism”. 
The first is to focus still more systematically on the relationship between formal and infor-
mal structures and particularly on the interplay between these in the democratic process. My 
colleague at University College London, Professor Alena Ledeneva, is the author of a book 
called How Russia Really Works. The answer to her implied question is, at one level simple: 
Russia, like other post-communist societies, “really works” through networks and structures 
of informal governance. Its formal political institutions, while they do matter, are somewhat 
hollow and subject to manipulation, instrumentalization and evasion (Ledeneva 2006; 2011). 
The Czech Republic is clearly not Russia: its institutions are more open and democratic; and 
its formal institutions stronger and more cohesive. Political and elite continuities with the 
communist era are weaker and traditions of democracy and bureaucratic autonomy stronger 
(Kitschelt 1999). However, arguably, we need to pose the same question of Central European 
democracies and ask How the Czech Republic Really Works. 
For a long time there has been a yawning gap between the coverage of Czech politics in 
the media and its coverage by political scientists. For journalists it is an unending story of 
scandals, corruption and personalized faction-fighting, while for political scientists, until re-
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new vocabulary of politics that started to appear in the Czech media in recent years – kmotr, 
velrybář, černé duše, trafika, kompro, válcování – has thus proved challenging only to trans-
late not only into English, but also into the language of political science.6 
In hindsight it is clear that political science research on the Czech Republic has struggled 
to understand the paradoxical co-existence of formal and informal structures for some time. 
To take one example, despite using very similar methodologies, Grzymała-Busse (2002) and 
O’Dwyer (2006) came to quite different conclusions about the Czech political system in their 
work on parties and the state in CEE. Grzymała-Busse argued that the Czech Republic lacked 
“robust party competition” – alternation in government between programmatic parties of left 
and right – resulting in corrupt, party-political exploitation of the state. O’Dwyer, by contrast, 
concluded that the Czech Republic could be described as a “responsible party system” and that 
the Czech state administration was developing an ethos of professionalism and bureaucratic 
independence. Read in parallel, these conclusions at first seem problematic and contradictory. 
Taken together the two works implied that increasingly professionalized public administration 
and genuinely programmatic parties existed in symbiosis with corrupt political abuse of the 
state (Hanley 2008).7 
The erosion of established Czech parties and the rise of new parties since 2010 has moved 
the debate on somewhat. However, the underlying challenge arguably remains the same: to 
understand the mix of formal representative politics and less formal (often, corrupt or clien-
telistic) institutions that characterize Czech democracy. Researchers on informal practices 
have typologized and framed this relationship in theoretical terms (Lauth 2000; 2004; Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004; Grzymała-Busse 2010) and, to an extent, illustrated it through elite sur-
veys (Grødeland 2007) and case studies often focusing on police, the judiciary and regulatory 
agencies (on the Czech Republic see especially Gallina 2011a; 2011b; 2013). Other authors 
have also identified, often in quite general terms, the mismatch between formally democratic 
institutions and illiberal or self-seeking political elites in CEE, often presenting elite culture 
as a master variable explaining the distortion of democracy in the region (Gallina 2007; 
Innes 2013).8 However, in contrast to Latin America (see for example, Levitsky 2001; 2003; 
Scherlis 2008), there are few in-depth studies of CEE party-based democracy which offer an 
integrated, holistic view of the operation of formal and informal structures.9
This  leaves  open  some  central  questions  including,  crucially,  that  of  “who  controls 
whom” – whether parties are clients of informal interest groups or vice versa – and where 
mass publics and bona fide party members fit in.10 A further unresolved issue is the extent 
to which parties in a democracy such as the Czech Republic, where parties are on first ex-
amination dominant plays benefitting from constitutionally entrenched “power monopoly” as 
gatekeepers to government office (Kopecký 2006) can, in fact, be regarded as strong collec-
tive actors. As Scherlis (2009: 1) suggests (of Argentina) “party organizations can nowadays 
be understood as webs of networks of office-holding politicians recruited by elected leaders 
to run the government under their leadership” and there is some evidence that Czech parties 
are better viewed as semi-coherent elite networks than well concerted exploiters of the state 
(Kopecký 2012).
The second move that political scientists interested in a democracy such as the Czech 
Republic might wish to make is to drill down more effectively into party and political or-
ganization. There is clearly a range of methods that could be deployed in trying to open the POLITOLOGICKÝ ČASOPIS / CZECH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  3/2014 170 171 ARTICLES
“black box” of parties’ internal organizational lives and power structures, all of which faces 
formidable challenges. However, one under-used strategy that might be better and more sys-
tematically employed is the well-focused case study capable of drilling into the sub-soil of 
locality, institution or organization in a theoretically informed way. One of the best studies 
written in English about Czech politics in the last ten years is Martin Horák’s (2007) book on 
Prague politics in 1990s Governing the Post-Communist City. The book undoubtedly does not 
capture all the Byzantine intrigues of politics in the Czech capital. However, as a detailed local 
case study, carefully framed in terms of new institutionalist theory, it does succeed in provid-
ing an analytical account of Czech (sub-national) democracy which integrates the working of 
bureaucracies, politicians and business and teases out the uneven “hybrid” quality of Czech 
politics and political institutions.11 However, even those more narrowly concerned with the 
“normal” functioning of specific formal institutions such as a political party can arguably gain 
from a more ethnographical approach (see, for example Faucher-King 2005). The Communist 
Party of Bohemia and Moravia, for example, seems to cry out for such an approach given its 
size and importance and apparent status as distinct, relatively closed, subculture within Czech 
society (Hanley 2001; see also Enyedi 1996).
9. Roads to Reform?
A realistic and nuanced understanding of how Czech democracy works should not stop efforts 
to improve it. However, unlike a valence issue such as anti-corruption where the basic goals 
are widely agreed (cleaner government, less corruption) – the direction of democratic reform 
is inevitably contested. There are the normative and empirical questions, trade-offs between 
representation, participation and efficient majority decision-making (Kitschelt 1993), most 
recently played out in the Czech context in debates over electoral reform and presidentialism 
(Baliìk 2013, Šedo 2013). There is also the related question of which institutions best fit Czech 
society. This is usually framed in terms of the Czech Republic’s smallness and relative social 
and ethnic homogeneity, but can also be linked to debates about which types of democratic 
structure are most susceptible to corruption and state capture.12 
Most pressing – and tied to both sets of issues – is the question of if (and how) “standard” 
party competition and party government, which have hitherto been building blocks of Czech 
democracy, can be rescued and rehabilitated, if indeed they are worth rehabilitating. As the 
experience of Petr Nečas and the Civic Democrats shows, would-be reformers of established 
parties can quickly falter in the face of powerful internal interests and irredeemably battered 
party reputations. New parties offer an obvious alternative route to renewal. Newly formed 
protest groupings are, however, often ephemeral; easily captured by vested interests; and pose 
problems for democratic quality. However, research suggests, there are organizational and 
political routes to their consolidation (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009; Bolleyer 2013). 
Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether consolidated new parties, even if not the product of 
business interests, could overcome the same corrosive environmental factors that ate into the 
“standard” party democracy established in 1990s. 
This leaves the possibility that legislatively and judicially enacted reforms – better regula-
tion of party funding; more enforcement of internal party democracy by the courts; conflict of POLITOLOGICKÝ ČASOPIS / CZECH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  3/2014 172 173 ARTICLES
interest legislation; electoral reform – might can chart a path to improvement. However, even 
if the necessary social and political consensus can be assembled, there is a dilemma about how 
reform might best be introduced. Given the unintended consequences that sweeping institu-
tional changes can bring (well-illustrated by the Czech experience of mass voucher privatiza-
tion in the 1990s) and the lack of an obvious mismatch between institutions and society in 
the Czech Republic, an incremental reform strategy of small “easy wins” may be advisable.13 
At the same time, given the systematic, interrelated nature of many of the problems afflicting 
parties, the option of a constitutional “big bang” – an approach increasingly recommended by 
transparency advocates to fight corruption (see, for example, Rothstein 2011) – may be attrac-
tive. Indeed, if the unravelling of the Czech party system were to escalate into a full blown 
party system breakdown on the Italian model (Morgan 2010), such a “big bang” may simply 
be enacted by events.
Notes:
   1. The 2013 CPI ranked the Czech Republic globally as joint 57th (equal with Croatia) with a score of 
48 in 2013 CPI, putting it ahead of Slovakia (47) Bulgaria (41) and Romania (43) – and outperform-
ing Italy (43) and Greece (40) but well behind Estonia (68), Poland (60), Lithuania (57), Slovenia 
(57) and Latvia (53). TI regards scores below 50 has indicating a “serious” problem of corruption. 
The 2012 CCI produces a very similar ranking with the Czech Republic placed between the same 
two groups of states.
   2. Measure 1.03 Diversion of Public Funds. Of EU member states only Slovakia (138) was worse 
ranked in 2012–3. A similar sharp deterioration is evident for Hungary, Bulgaria and (from a much 
higher base) Slovenia. The WCI measure is based on a survey of business executives.
   3. As Roberts (2003) suggests such claims may exaggerate the cartel-like character and consequences 
of the Agreement. 
   4. He also writes of “(…) a kind of Copernican revolution” taking place in which parties “have set 
aside their role as intermediaries between a pluralistic society and the state to attach themselves still 
further firstly to opaque business interests and secondly to the state” (Klíma 2013: 226).
   5. Klíma (2013: 231) notes realistically that the “clientelistic party” model he outlines is a theoretical 
ideal type and that most real life cases will be “(…) transitional states or hybrids”. It is unclear to 
what extent he regards the Czech case as a paradigmatic illustration of the clientelistic party’ model, 
however. 
   6. For example, as Kopecký (2012) notes, the local meaning of the term klientelismus which features 
widely in Czech language writing on Czech politics is not the same as that of clientelism as the 
term is used in much social science literature in English. As elsewhere in contemporary CEE, the 
pattern of classical mass clientelism and patronage to “buy” votes is absent in the Czech Republic. 
As Kopecký’s work shows politicians’ use of patronage to allocate top level administrative posts in 
the region today is more concerned with securing control than rewarding supporters.
   7. The difference is also explained by the fact that O’Dwyer was concerned with vertical account-
ability – between voters and parties – and Grzymała-Busse with horizontal accountability (parties 
keeping each other in check; monitoring and auditing institutions). 
   8. This work echoes the writing on “post-communism” of the early 1990s when expectations regard-
ing the prospects of democracy in CEE were pessimistic (Schöpflin 1994; Tismaneanu 1996). Its 
stress is, however, more strongly on elite subversion or distortion of democracy, rather than the risk 
of post-communist societies generating populism and nationalism engendering a Latin American-
style breakdown of democracy (for a discussion see Greskovits 1998).
   9. In the Czech context, Klíma’s (2013) pioneering study perhaps comes closest. POLITOLOGICKÝ ČASOPIS / CZECH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  3/2014 172 173 ARTICLES
 10. As Katz (2014) notes, issues of accountability and principal-agent relationships in party democracy 
are already complex without the incorporation of clientelistic informal actors alongside formally 
constituted players.
 11. Horák that found some policy sectors (such as transport planning) in the city government retained 
a degree of bureaucratic autonomy, while others (zoning in historic centre of Prague) quickly suc-
cumbed to the influence of corrupt vested interests embedded in local party politics.
 12. Carsten Q. Schneider (2003) argues that the key to democratic success in post-communist socie-
ties is to have centralized rather than power-dispersing institutions, cutting down the space open to 
exploitation by informal actors in the absence of well-developed civil society.
 13. I take this point from Andrew Roberts’s contribution to a roundtable on political reform at the 10th 
Czech Political Science Symposium, Brno 3 April 2014.
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